NBC has previously reported that Joseph, the NSC official, and the CIA’s weapons proliferation director, Alan Foley, argued back and forth about whether the reference should have been in the speech. Sources have told the network that, after Foley objected to the first draft of the passage, Joseph came up with the suggestion of attributing it to the British, asking Foley if that would make it technically correct. Since the British were reporting it, Foley had to acknowledge that the passage was factually accurate, even though the CIA did not think the assertion was true, according to the sources. Foley never consulted his superiors on the dispute, so Tenet never read or approved it, the sources said.

As Tenet obviously intended, even Republicans are now asking tough questions about the role of National Security advisor Condi Rice, and, in particular, her deputy, Steve Hadley…the two senior political appointees who's approval of Joseph's actions were essential, observers agree. -- Hadley, especially, has some explaining to do, given that Tenet called him in early October, 2002, to warn that the Niger information was doubtful, and should be deleted from the prepared text of an Oct. 9 Bush speech.
5. And this incident alone puts Rice in the difficult position of having to explain why she said just last week (July 11) that no one at her level knew of the CIA's doubts about the Niger information at the time of the State of the Union, several months after the Tenet/Hadley chat.